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courts, judges. We are the last survivors who cry so.
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ABSTRACT
This article examines major theoretical dilemmas underpinning measures
of transitional justice in general and the reparation of victims of human
rights violations in particular. It assesses the role of financial compensation,
justice, truth-telling, forgiveness, democratization, and other factors that
are assumed to heal victims of political violence. In order to test their
influence, we conducted a survey of former political prisoners in the Czech
Republic. Findings from our regression analyses reveal that reparation is a
two-dimensional process that incorporates sociopolitical redress and inner
healing. These dimensions correlate positively with financial compensa-
tion and democratization; and negatively with public truth telling, the lack
of reconciliation, and continued stigmatization by neighbors. At the same
time, most proxies of retributive desires are not significantly related to the
outcomes of reparation. These associations are interpreted in the light of
narrative accounts obtained through interviews, letters, and observations.
The results indicate that individual reparation, if it is to be successful, must
be an organic part of a broader policy of social reconstruction. Based on
our findings, we propose a victim-oriented model of social reconstruction
for transitional countries.
I. INTRODUCTION
Claims for reparation for historical injustices stretch across different catego-
ries of atrocities, including acts of injustice committed during World War II,
acts perpetrated by “state terrorism” in authoritarian Latin America, commu-
nist Central and Eastern Europe, and apartheid South Africa, and demands
arising from European colonialism. This article focuses on reparation that
concerns transitional democracies seeking to redress gross violations of
human rights caused by predecessor regimes.
Reparation, in common parlance, refers to financial and material
compensation. However, many scholars and practitioners in the field of
transitional justice use the term more generally to encompass not just a
single act or mechanism but a process that “has the purpose of relieving the
suffering of and affording justice to victims by removing or redressing to the
extent possible the consequences of the wrongful acts and by preventing
and deterring violations.”2 They use reparation as an umbrella concept that
2. Theo van Boven, Study Concerning the Right to Restitution, Compensation and
Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, excerpted in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE VOL. I: HOW EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH
FORMER REGIMES 505, 511, 548 (Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995). This article uses the term
“victims,” which, in sources quoted, is more common than “survivors.” The present
study only concerns direct victims. It does not cover the immediate family or
dependents of victims, as stipulated by van Boven. Id. at 514–15.
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includes four components: restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, and
satisfaction and guarantees of nonrepetition.3 According to them, all four
components should be included in a comprehensive program of redress.4
Yet this remains an unattainable goal for most countries because of political
constraints imposed by the old elite, budgetary limitations, moral opposi-
tion to financial compensation, and uncertainties surrounding the purported
needs of victims. International acclaim for the South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission (TRC), which emphasizes truth-telling and
reconciliation in the process of healing, has further challenged the funda-
mentals of traditional thinking on reparation. In particular, the utility of
financial compensation and criminal trials have been questioned by some
scholars.5
3. Revised Set of Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Reparation for Victims of
Gross Violations of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Prepared by Mr. Theo van
Boven Pursuant to Sub-Commission Decision 1995/117, U.N. ESCOR, Sub-Comm’n on
Hum. Rts., 48th Sess., E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/17 (1996); The Right to Restitution, Compen-
sation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Grave Violations of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, C.H.R. Res. No. 2003/34, U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on Hum. Rts.,
57th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/62 (2003). See also PRISCILLA HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE
TRUTHS: CONFRONTING STATE TERROR AND ATROCITY 171 (2001) (adopting the same definition);
Wendy Orr, Reparation Delayed is Healing Retarded, in LOOKING BACK, REACHING FORWARD:
REFLECTIONS ON THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION IN SOUTH AFRICA 239, 241 (Charles
Villa-Vicencio & Wilhelm Verword eds., 2000) (Orr, one of the TRC’s commissioners,
recalls “Our initial working definition of reparation was dubbed ‘the five Rs’: redress,
restitution, rehabilitation, restoration and reassurance of non-recurrence.”). Cf. RUTI G.
TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 119 (2000) (“The vocabulary of ‘reparatory justice’ illustrates its
multiple dimensions, comprehending numerous diverse forms: reparations, damages,
remedies, redress, restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, tribute.”).
4. According to van Boven’s principles, as revised by M. Cherif Bassiouni in van Boven,
Study Concerning the Right to Restitution, supra note 2, restitution should restore the
victim to the original situation before the violations of international human rights or
humanitarian law occurred, such as restoration of liberty, legal rights, social status,
family life and citizenship, restoration of employment and return of property. Compen-
sation should be provided for any economically assessable damage, such as physical or
mental harm, and lost opportunities including: education, material damages and loss of
earnings and earning potential, harm to reputation or dignity, and costs required for
legal assistance and medical, psychological and social services. Rehabilitation should
include medical and psychological care as well as legal and social services. Satisfaction
and guarantees of nonrepetition should include cessation of continuing violations,
verification of the facts and full and public disclosure of the truth, the search for the
bodies of those killed or disappeared, an official declaration or a judicial decision
restoring the dignity and rights of the victim and of persons closely connected with the
victim, apology (including public acknowledgment of the facts and acceptance of
responsibility), judicial or administrative sanctions against persons responsible for the
violations, commemorations and tributes to the victims, and preventing the recurrence
of violations.
5. MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS
VIOLENCE 103 (1998) (“[M]oney remains incommensurable with what was lost. . . .
[R]eparations fall short of repairing victims or social relationships after violence. This
inevitable shortfall makes me wonder about the assumption that the most obvious need
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Whether the importance of truth-telling and reconciliation surpasses
that of criminal trials and financial compensation in achieving the aims of
reparation remains an unanswered question. What do victims need in order
to heal past wounds? What do justice, truth, and reconciliation mean for
them? Despite victims being the direct beneficiaries of reparation programs,
and despite the fact that macropolitical decisions of how to deal with the
past are often justified by their desires,6 there are few studies of the victims.7
In part, this reflects the lack of empirical research in the field of transitional
justice.8
of victims is for compensation.”); See also Laurel E. Fletcher & Harvey M. Weinstein,
Violence and Social Repair: Rethinking the Contribution of Justice to Reconciliation, 24
HUM. RTS. Q. 573, 603 (2002) (“[T]he emphasis on criminal trials as the primary
international response to mass violence does not respond to the needs of many for
social repair.”).
6. See van Boven, Study Concerning the Right to Restitution, supra note 2, at 548
(“Reparation should respond to the needs and wishes of victims.”). “Victims’ needs” are
sometimes used to justify criminal trials or promote a truth commission. See infra notes
49, 55. On the other hand, some warn that victims’ claims, however morally justified,
may threaten the transition. See JAIME MALAMUD-GOTI, GAME WITHOUT END: STATE TERROR AND
THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE 13 (1996) (stating that the claims of the Mothers from Plaza de Mayo
to try all perpetrators would lead to “political and logistic disaster.”). Cf. Bert van
Roermund, Rubbing Off and Rubbing On: The Grammar of Reconciliation, in LETHE’S
LAW: JUSTICE, LAW AND ETHICS IN RECONCILIATION 175, 184–86 (Emilios Christodoulidis & Scott
Veitch eds., 2001) (van Roermund criticizes the tendency of survivors of oppression to
speak on behalf of victims: “‘We want to forgive.’” They tend to “picture themselves as
‘the good people’: the ones who, from now on, will have the absolute right to command
because they were absolutely right in the way they suffered.”)
7. In addition to van Boven’s studies, there are a number of victim studies that inspire us.
See, e.g., David Becker et al., Therapy with Victims of Political Repression in Chile: The
Challenge of Social Reparation, 46 J. SOC. ISSUES 133 (1990), excerpted in TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE VOL. I, supra note 2, at 583; Yael Danieli, Preliminary Reflections from
Psychological Perspective, excerpted in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE VOL. I, supra note 2, at 572;
IVAN GADOUREK & JIRI NEHNEVAJSA, ZALAROVANI, PRONASLEDOVANI A ZNEUZNANI: SVEDECTVI JESTE ZIJICICH
OBETI STALINISMU V CESKYCH ZEMICH [INCARCERATED, PERSECUTED, AND FORGOTTEN: A TESTIMONY OF THE
STILL LIVING VICTIMS OF STALINISM IN THE CZECH COUNTRIES] (1997) (A survey with historical
objectives among political victims in the Czech Rep.). See also Brandon Hamber,
Repairing the Irreparable, 5 ETHNICITY & HEALTH 215 (2000), available at www.csvr.org.za/
papers/paprepbh.htm; SARAH CULLINAN, REDRESS, TORTURE SURVIVORS’ PERCEPTIONS OF REPARATION
9, 49 (2001), available at www.redress.org/publications/TSPR.pdf (based on a review of
the literature on reparation and interviews with those who work with victims, she
highlights the need for empirical research that would go beyond the psychological level
and assess the impact of restoration of dignity, acknowledgment, etc.). The majority of
the literature focuses on victims’ perception of their reparation and adopts a psychologi-
cal approach. The present study adopts sociological methods to assess factors associ-
ated with reparation of victims of human rights abuses in the context of transitional
justice and democratization.
8. As Neil Kritz lamented
Truth commissions have become almost routine. . . . You have a transition and everybody
immediately says we have to have a truth commission without any clear understanding as to why
or what they are about. Except for some of the preliminary and good quality work . . . there is a
real dearth of any serious empirical research on exactly what impact truth commissions actually
have in any place, impact on victims, on perpetrators, on society as a whole. . . .
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This article presents results that are based on a survey and in-depth
interviews with former Czech political prisoners. The article identifies the
major theoretical debates and challenges of reparation policies in transi-
tional democracies, and develops and tests corresponding hypotheses
concerning factors that are alleged to affect the outcome of individual
reparation: (a) financial compensation; (b) the purported needs of victims for
retribution, public truth-telling, and reconciliation; and (c) social acknowl-
edgment, community integration, and democratization. The postcommunist
Czech Republic9 is a suitable research site as its reparation program
encompasses financial compensation, property restitution, judicial rehabili-
tation, social acknowledgement of the resistance against past political
oppression, medical treatment, attempts to prosecute former communist
elite, and lustration.10
The next section briefly reviews reparation policy during the transition
in the Czech Republic. Section III discusses the major theoretical debates
about reparation in transitional countries. The hypotheses used in the study
are based on this review. Parts IV, V, and VI are the main empirical parts of
the article. They explain the operationalization of the testing variables, the
data collection method, and the results of the regression analysis. Section
VII interprets the findings in the light of narrative accounts collected during
in-depth interviews. The final section of the article discusses the limitations
of the research and its policy implications.
Victoria Baxter, American Association for the Advancement of Science, Conference
Report: Empirical Research Methodologies of Transitional Justice Mechanisms 1 (18–20
Nov. 2002), available at shr.aaas.org/transitionaljustice/mtjm/stellenbosch.pdf. Simi-
larly, Fletcher & Weinstein, supra note 5, at 585, noted that “A primary weakness of
writings on transitional justice is the paucity of empirical evidence to substantiate
claims about how well criminal trials achieve goals ascribed to them.”
9. In 1990, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic was renamed the Czech and Slovak
Federative Republic, which was divided in 1993 into two independent states: the Czech
Republic and the Slovak Republic. This article uses “Czechoslovakia” or “Czech
Republic” [depending on which is considered more accurate for the time.]
10. See generally Roman David, Lustration Laws in Action: The Motives and Evaluation of
Lustration Policy in the Czech Republic and Poland (1989–2001), 28 L. & SOC. INQ. 387,
388 (“Lustration law is a special public employment law that regulates the process of
examining whether a person holding certain higher public positions worked or
collaborated with the repressive apparatus of the Communist regime.”). See also Maria
Los, Lustration and Truth Claims: Unfinished Revolutions in Central Europe, 20 L. & SOC.
INQ. 117 (1995); Natalia Letki, Lustration and Democratisation in East-Central Europe,
54 EUR.-ASIA STUD. 529 (2002); Aleks Szczerbiak, Dealing with the Communist Past or the
Politics of the Present? Lustration in Post-Communist Poland, 54 EUR.-ASIA STUD. 553
(2002); Roman David, Transitional Injustice? Criteria for Conformity of Lustration to the
Right to Political Expression, 56 EUR.-ASIA STUD. 789 (2004).
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II. MAKING AMENDS AFTER COMMUNISM IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Mikhail Gorbachev’s policy not to use the Soviet military might, the
crawling disintegration of communism in Hungary, negotiation between the
Polish government and Solidarity, and the fall of the Berlin Wall all left the
Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in political isolation. In that context,
student strikes and unexpected massive demonstrations across the country
were sufficient to cause regime change within a few days in November
1989. Unlike the situation in other Central European countries, the old elite
in Czechoslovakia lost control of decision making at the central Govern-
ment level. This enabled the new government to make greater progress in
dealing with the past than its neighbors could.11 It abolished the leading role
of the Communist Party, nationalized its property, repealed the repressive
provisions of the penal code, and dissolved repressive organs of state.12
However, the massive scale of repression13 and an economy devastated by
11. There is consensus among scholars that the distribution of power during regime change
crucially affects the policy of dealing with the past. See, e.g., David Pion-Berlin, To
Prosecute or to Pardon? Human Rights Decisions in the Latin American Southern Cone,
16 HUM. RTS. Q. 105 (1994). See also Jose Zalaquett, Balancing Ethical Imperatives and
Political Constraints: The Dilemma of New Democracies Confronting Past Human
Rights Violations, 43 HASTINGS L. J. 1425 (1992); Helga A. Welsh, Dealing with the
communist past: Central and East European experiences after 1990, 48 EUR.-ASIA STUD.
413 (1996); SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY
(1991), excerpted in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE VOL. I, supra note 2, at 65. Using Huntington’s
classification of regime changes, Czechoslovakia belongs to “replacements,” which
signify government collapse, rather than “transplacements,” which indicate negotiated
changes, such as in Poland, or “transformations,” signifying changes initiated by the old
elite, such as in Hungary. Although some communists were nominated to the 1989–
1990 transitional government, they were mostly selected by the Civic Forum (OF), not
by the Communist Party (KSC). Shortly after their appointment, they switched their
allegiance to the Forum (Komarek, Dlouhy) or their office was (made) redundant and
cancelled.
12. The parliament abrogated the leading role of the Party in November 1989. See Act
Changing Const. Act No. 100/1960, The Constitution of the CSSR, Const. Act No. 135/
1989 Sb. In 1989–1990, it revoked those provisions of the penal code that criminalized
the exercise of human rights. The Party property was confiscated a few months after the
first democratic elections. See Act On the Return of Property of the Communist Party of
Czechoslovakia to the People of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic, Const. Act
No. 496/1990 Sb.
13. The number of fatalities under the communist rule in Czechoslovakia was close to that
of Chile under Pinochet, while the ratio of political prisoners to the civil population was
almost the same as in Uruguay, 1:50. In Czechoslovakia, between 1948 and 1989,
about 234 people were judicially executed for political reasons and more than 4,000
political prisoners died under unclear circumstances, for example, as a consequence of
torture. Hundreds died while crossing the border and about 262,500 people were jailed
for political reasons. See Karel Pacner, Stovky zmareny;ch lidsky;ch zivotu, statisíce
rozbity;ch rodin [Hundreds of Lost Lives, Hundreds of Thousands Destroyed Families],
MF DNES, 25 Feb. 2000. See also Interview with Otto Stehlík, Director of the Archive of
the KPV, Prague (18 Jan. 2000). During the 1950s and 1960s, many political prisoners
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central planning made it virtually impossible to remedy all human rights
violations as postulated by international human rights law.14 Consequently,
the Czech Republic reparation policy concerned only the most serious
injustices committed by the communist regime between 1948 and 1989,
and relieved victims on a very limited scale. In this section, the authors
review the policies relevant to this study, including judicial rehabilitation,
financial compensation, sanctions against perpetrators, and truth-revelation.
In an attempt to end victimization, the Act on Judicial Rehabilitation15
repealed judicial decisions and ensured that disputed cases related to acts
were held not only in prisons but also in eighteen concentration camps, the so called
“remedy-labor camps,” where they were subjected to an extraordinarily hard regime
and gross violations of human rights including torture, slave labor in uranium mines
(without any protection from radioactivity), reduction of daily food allotment, and extra
punishments. See Interview with Frantisek Zahrádka, Director of the Museum of the
Third Resistance, Pribram (13 Jan. 2000). About 100,000 victims in the camps of forced
labor were not prisoners in the then legal terms but quasi-judicially persecuted “class
enemies”. About 60,000 men were forced to serve in the so called “Auxiliary Technical
Battalions” (PTP) and more than 6,300 monks and nuns were sent to assembly camps in
1950. Thousands of people were evicted from cities, hundreds of thousands lost their
jobs in purges that followed the years 1948 and 1968, and private property was almost
entirely nationalized. See KAREL KAPLAN, POLITICAL PERSECUTION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1948–1972,
11–31 (1983); JIRÍ BÍLEK & KAREL KAPLAN, POMOCNÉ TECHNICKÉ PRAPORY 1950–1954 & TÁBORY
NUCENÉ PRÁCE V CESKOSLOVENSKU 1948–1954 [AUXILIARY TECHNICAL BATTALIONS 1950–54 & CAMPS
OF THE FORCED LABOR IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1948–54] (1992). For a bibliography and filmography
on the topic, see KAREL BARTOSEK, CESKY VEZEN: SVEDECTVI POLITICKYCH VEZENKYN A VEZNU LET
PADESATYCH, SEDESATYCH A SEDMDESATYCH [A CZECH PRISONER: TESTIMONIES OF POLITICAL PRISONERS OF THE
1950S, 1960S AND 1970S] 307, 311 (2001).
14. Unlike other undemocratic regimes, socialist Czechoslovakia ratified various interna-
tional human rights treaties that postulate the right to remedy human rights violations.
See, e.g., the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 16 Dec.
1966, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, arts. 2 and 9, U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force 3 Jan. 1976). This covenant
grants the right to effective remedy and the right to compensation, respectively. The
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment states “the victim of an act of torture obtains redress and has an enforceable
right to fair and adequate compensation, including the means for as full rehabilitation as
possible.” Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, adopted 10 Dec. 1984, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th
Sess., Supp. No. 51, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1985) (entered into force 26 June 1987),
reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984), substantive changes noted in 24 I.L.M. 535 (1985).
However, more than these documents, the then Czechoslovak representatives, who
sought to distinguish themselves from their predecessors, felt obliged by the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, which postulates the right to an effective remedy.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted 10 Dec. 1948, G.A. Res. 217A (III),
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess. (Resolutions, pt. 1), at 71, art. 8, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948),
reprinted in 43 AM. J. INT’L L. 127 (Supp. 1949). They also desired to integrate the country
into the Western community and anticipated the approval of the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed 4 Nov. 1950,
art. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force 3 Sept. 1953), which grants an enforceable
right to compensation.
15. Act No. 119/1990 Sb., §§ 1–6. This act was approved on 23 April 1990, a few weeks
before the first democratic elections.
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contravening the principles of democracy and human rights were re-
opened.16 All rehabilitated persons were entitled to make decisions con-
cerning their rehabilitation public. The Act also cancelled decisions that
expelled students and dismissed employees for political reasons. Even
relatives of deceased victims were entitled to submit formal requests for
“reinstatement” of their employment.
Financial compensation was paid to surviving victims or the heirs of
those who were executed or died in detention.17 Each political prisoner
received a little compensation for salary losses, health damages, legal fees,
and judicial fines, as well as CZK 2,500 (approximately US $83) for each
month of his or her incarceration. Many of these provisions were options
that allowed concerned persons to use other legal means to seek redress.
The Act also equalized the disadvantages of former political prisoners with
regard to pensions. Additional financial compensation was provided by the
Act on the Illegitimacy of the Communist Regime and on Resistance Against
It, which amounted to CZK 625 for each month of imprisonment.18 Former
political prisoners also enjoyed other material support, including free public
transport, organizational subsidies, special medical treatment, and modest
spa subsidies.19 Some political prisoners were critical of the provisions
because former secret police had received greater compensation payouts at
the time of their forced retirement than many political prisoners received.20
16. The judicial rehabilitation concerned at least 257,864 people condemned by the
Czechoslovak communist judiciary between 25 February 1948 and 1 January 1990. Of
these, 195,642 people were from the territory of the Czech Republic. FRANTISEK KOUDELKA
ET AL., SOUDNÍ PERZEKUCE POLITICKÉ POVAHY V CESKOSLOVENSKU 1948–1989: STATISTICKY; PREHLED [THE
JUDICIAL PERSECUTIONS OF A POLITICAL CHARACTER IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1948–1989: STATISTIC OVERVIEW]
57–68 (1993). The author of this statistic concludes that the number may increase by 2
percent. However, Stehlík rejected the accuracy of these figures and considered these
numbers as partial. In his view, the number could have been about 50,000 higher
because many victims had already died and their relatives, if any, did not apply for their
rehabilitation. See Interview with Otto Stehlík, Director of the Archive of the KPV,
Prague (18 Jan. 2000). The number rehabilitated does not necessarily equal the number
imprisoned: some people were condemned for their emigration, others were con-
demned but their sentence was suspended, while others were jailed more than once.
17. Act on Judicial Rehabilitation, Act No. 119/1990 Sb., §§ 23–28. In addition, the Act on
Extra-Judicial Rehabilitation, Act No. 87/1991 Sb., concerned the restitution of confis-
cated properties in the possession of the State, municipalities, and cooperatives, to their
original owners or their heirs.
18. Act No. 198/1993 Sb., § 8 [hereinafter Act on the Illegitimacy of the Communist
Regime]. The compensation was implemented by a government directive in 1997.
Payment of the One-time Compensation to Mitigate Some Injustices Caused by the
Communist Regime, Government Directive No. 165/1997 Sb. See also infra note 106.
19. For example, in 1994, the organization received a subsidy of CZK 1,75 million that
contributed to 85 percent of such expenses for about 600 of its members. ZPRAVODAJ KPV
[Newsletter of the Confederation of Political Prisoners] Vol. 1.4, 1994, at 5.
20. If a policeman with a salary of CZK 10,000 was dismissed after twenty years of service,
he was entitled to a compensation of CZK 80,000 plus CZK 3,800 monthly income paid
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Furthermore, while their initial compensation was paid in two installments
in 1990 and 1995, allegedly due to state budgetary constraints, all payments
to secret police were made in lump sum immediately.
A truth commission was not established in the Czech Republic. The
truth about past oppression was revealed mainly by the media and
facilitated through access to the secret police files, similar to the German
Stasi Records Act.21 However, the Act on the Access to Files Created through
the Activities of the State Security was also a disappointment for those who
were detained and tortured under communism because the names of those
who informed on them were blotted out from the records. In 1995, the
Office for the Documentation and Investigation of Communist Crimes
(ODICC) was established to replace its less effective predecessor, which had
been established in the early 1990s. Its tasks included investigation, data-
collection, and the analysis of activities related to the injustices of the past
regime, along with the resistance to it.22 Social acknowledgment of previous
oppression was delivered through parliamentary acts and government
activities. First, the Act on the Illegitimacy of the Communist Regime
acknowledged the illegitimacy of the old regime and honored the resist-
ance.23 This Act bore enormous symbolic meaning for ex-political prisoners.
It became their manifesto and was framed and displayed in their organiza-
tions, on public boards, and on their web sites. In addition, some former
political prisoners received state honors or were invited by President Havel
to Prague Castle to acknowledge their past sacrifices, while others were
awarded honorary citizenships by town halls.24
The prosecution of political crimes, for which the perpetrators enjoyed
until his retirement. Jaroslav Spurny;, Odskodné pro estébáky [COMPENSATION FOR SPOOKS],
RESPEKT, 8 June 1992, at 4; Rebeka Krizanová & Martin Bartunek, Dobre zaplaceny ; civil
[Well Paid Dismissals], RESPEKT, 23 Nov. 1992, at 5.
21. See Access to Files Created by Activity of the Former State Security, Act No. 140/1996
Sb., §§ 5–6.
22. See Police of the Czech Republic, Office of the Documentation and the Investigation of
the Crimes of Communism, ¶ 1, available at www.mvcr.cz/policie/udv/english/
index.html (stating the objectives of the office). The Office of the Documentation and
the Investigation of the Crimes of Communism (ODICC) meets some of Hayner’s criteria
of a truth commission: it focuses on the past, it investigates the patterns of abuses over
a period of time rather than a specific event, it is authorized by the state, and it is
established as a part of the political transition. However, it is not a temporary body,
which would be expected to submit a report (although it regularly publishes memorial
volumes and other materials, organizes lectures, and informs about the status of cases
under investigation). See HAYNER, supra note 3, at 14, 17.
23. Act No. 198/1993 Sb., §§ 3–4.
24. Many of these symbolic measures, however, also generated reverse effects, for example,
past political records of other awarded persons were questioned. See David, supra note
10, at 420 n. 78. Additionally, many political prisoners could not forgive President
Havel for canceling the meeting with them due to an illness caused by an earlier
outdoor celebration of an Olympic gold medal with the ice hockey players in 1998.
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impunity during communism, is a major failure of the effort to deal with the
past. The impact of continuity between old and new criminal law was
lessened with the promulgation of the Act on the Illegitimacy of the
Communist Regime. It provided for the renewal of the Statute of Limitations
to deal with crimes that were not prosecuted for political reasons.25 Justified
by the brinkmanship on the edge of legal continuity and value discontinuity,
it enabled the new Government to prosecute communist crimes without
violating the prohibition against retroactivity.26 Furthermore, the Office for
Documentation and Investigation of the Crimes of Communism was set up
to support state prosecution. These measures, however, resulted in a dismal
number of prosecutions and criminal trials. By June 30, 2000, only eight
perpetrators had been found guilty, and among them five received sus-
pended sentences.27 This failure reflects a combination of structural obstacles
in legal, institutional, and personnel continuity with the past, postcommunist
mentality,28 and ideological constraints stemming from the peaceful nature
of the Velvet Revolution. Characterized by the slogan “we are not like
them,” the ideology of the Velvet Revolution weakened the political will to
prosecute during the initial period of transition.29
The new elite expected those associated with the former regime to leave
their posts voluntarily. These expectations were, however, not met and
triggered desires for retribution that were intensified by comparison with the
25. Act No. 198/1993 Sb., § 5.
26. See Judgment of the Const. Ct. of the Czech Rep., concerning the petition of 41 deputies
seeking the annulment of act No. 198/1993 on the Illegitimacy of the Communist
Regime and on the Resistance against It, Pl. ÚS 19/93 (21 Dec. 1993).
27. See Police of the Czech Republic, supra note 22, available at www.mvcr.cz/policie/udv/
english/pripady/index.html. The number of launched prosecutions has recently risen.
28. This mentality is indicated by political submissiveness and an inability to make
independent decisions. See, e.g., Vojtech Cepl & Mark Gillis, Making Amends after
Communism, 7 J. DEMOCRACY 118, 123 (1996). There are numerous examples of this
mentality yet to be researched, such as the case of Grebenicek, whose judge has not
been able to bring to justice his alleged torturer for six years. See Grebenicka u soudu
omluvil fax [Grebenicek Apologizes for his Absence at Court by Fax], IDNES, 12 May
2003.
29. “We are not like them” was a slogan that was initially addressed by the leaders of the
democratic opposition to the people who protested against the Communist regime in
1989. Later, however, it became a symbol of the failure to deal with the past. Vaclav
Havel, the author of this slogan, later tried to clarify: “the error happened later, in the
early months of 1990, when all of us underestimated our former opponents’ extraordi-
nary artfulness and ability to adapt to the new conditions. To remedy this error will
probably be a long and difficult process, but remedied it must be—in a cultured, legal
and civilized manner. ‘We are not like them,’ I said once on Wenceslas Square, but if
we do not want to be like “them,” we must not be blinded by fanaticism, hatred and the
desire for bloodthirsty revenge. This does not mean, however, that we can tolerate
whatever ‘they’ do, or that we should not prosecute those who committed criminal
offenses.” Vaclav Havel, New Year’s Address to the Nation, Prague (1 Jan. 1992).
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experience of dealing with Nazism.30 In order to address the problem of
personnel continuity and to enhance trust in the emerging democracy, the
new elite turned to lustrations. It approved a law that facilitated personnel
changes in leading posts of the state and security apparatus.31
Political prisoners are, however, critical that the lustration law has not
prevented all their former adversaries from holding positions of influence in
the new democracy. With the exception of Vaclav Klaus (1992–1997), all
post-1989 prime ministers were previously members of the Communist
Party. Prisoners often mentioned the example of Prime Minister Marian
Calfa, who switched his allegiance after the collapse of Communism,
survived the severe defeat of the Communist Party in the first democratic
election in 1990, and maintained his post as the prime minister until the
second election in 1992.
Political prisoners are also critical of several events, which resonated
while conducting the survey. A series of party-financing scandals and an
economic recession resulted in the collapse of the center-right coalition led
by Vaclav Klaus in 1997. After the unstable interim government of Prime
Minister Josef Tosovsky, the social democrats, led by Milos Zeman, won the
early elections of 1998. Many ex-prisoners who campaigned against Zeman
felt betrayed by Klaus, whose party backed the social democratic govern-
ment until the elections of 2002.32
III. THEORIES AND HYPOTHESES
In a study that inspired the formulation of reparation principles, van Boven
and his colleagues argued that reparation should include financial and other
material compensation, nonmaterial reparation with emphasis on truth
revelation and social acknowledgment, prosecution of perpetrators, and
preventive measures.33 The growing popularity of truth commissions and
30. The issue of banning the Communist Party was often raised in discussions during the
first months of transition. In the interviews conducted for this study, many political
prisoners, who continued to advocate the ban, based their arguments on past
experiences with Nazi parties and organizations after World War II.
31. Act 451/1991 Sb., that prescribes certain prerequisites for the exercise of certain
positions filled by election, appointment, or assignment in State organs and organiza-
tions of CSFR, CR and SR (hereinafter lustration law) For a recent evaluation of the
lustration policy in the Czech Republic, see David, supra note 10.
32. For an overview of the democratic development in the country, see Jiri Pehe, Reports on
Eastern Europe, available at www.pehe.cz/E.html; E. EUR. CONST. REV. (1992–2002)
(quarterly country reports).
33. Theo van Boven et al., Seminar on the Right to Restitution, Compensation and
Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms: Summary and Conclusions, excerpted in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE VOL. I, supra note
2, at 500, 502–03.
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their theoretical reflections fueled the debate with new questions: Could
symbolic measures substitute financial compensation? Would victims be
satisfied with the establishment of accountability of perpetrators via truth?
This section reviews the major theoretical debates underpinning reparation,
focusing on financial compensation, retributive and restorative justice,
truth-telling, social acknowledgment, and structural reform.
A. Financial Compensation
Does money matter? Many believe that it does. Indeed, attempts to gain
monetary compensation have taken center stage in “reparation politics”
globally. The increase in litigation against companies that profited from
slave labor in Nazi Germany and apartheid South Africa confirms this
trend.34 This explains why reparation is often narrowly defined as financial
compensation. Yet monetary compensation has also sparked controversy. Its
opponents argue that when survivors accept money it demeans the memory
of deceased victims and allows perpetrators to extinguish all moral guilt by
claiming that the debt has been repaid. For instance, some Mothers of Plaza
de Mayo, whose sons disappeared during Argentinean military rule, refused
to accept financial compensation on the ground that it would diminish their
claims for truth and justice.35 Such suspicion is likely to intensify when
victims “perceive that the government does not represent their interests . . .
[and] suspect that the government is trying to buy its way out of its
culpability by paying ‘blood money[,]’ . . . [and when the government] does
not forcefully investigate human rights claims or fails to impose strong
punitive sanctions on those responsible for violations.”36
Those with concerns about the social effect of paying compensation
worry that disputes surrounding it could sully the historical message,
34 For a comparative analysis of reparation demands, see Michael L. Bazyler, The
Holocaust Restitution Movement in Comparative Perspective, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 11
(2002); John Torpey, “Making Whole What Has Been Smashed”: Reflections on
Reparations, 73 J. MOD. HIST. 333 (2001).
35. See, e.g., MALAMUD-GOTI, supra note 6, at 13.
36. Ellen L. Lutz, After the Elections: Compensating Victims of Human Rights Abuses, in
NEW DIRECTIONS IN HUMAN RIGHTS (Ellen L. Lutz et al. eds., 1989), excerpted in TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE VOL. I, supra note 2, at 551, 553.
A new government faced with severe economic problems may consider an expensive compensa-
tion program to be of considerably lower national priority than the revitalization of the economy
or the repayment of foreign debt. Where individuals responsible for past violations of human
rights . . . retain politically powerful positions, establishing mechanisms for compensating former
victims may involve serious political risks. . . . [F]ormer victims may feel stigmatized by their need
to seek redress and may fear that the procedures for claiming compensation will be degrading or
will require them to relive painful past experiences.
Id. at 552–53.
Vol. 27404 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY
compromise the truth as being instrumental, and revive old hatred.37 From
this perspective, compensation in fact perpetuates the conflict that it is
supposed to overcome.38 Many intellectuals, for example, worry that the
Holocaust restitution movement may trigger new waves of anti-Semitism.39
Inimical responses of former adversaries within the community, fear about
such responses from within the victim’s group, and concerns that compen-
sation may provoke envy among “bystanders” may create pressure on
victims, aggravating their marginalization.
In the light of these controversies, some commentators are more
cautious, giving priority to the symbolic components of redress over
financial compensation. For example, Minow asserts that “[s]ocial and
religious meanings rather than economic values lie at the heart of repara-
tions.”40 She also suggests that “[t]he return to a symbolic dimension seems
crucial because, in fact, most victims of crime rate their need to know what
happened and why more highly than their desires for compensation or
restitution.”41 Adding to this ambivalence is the worldwide acclaim of the
South African TRC. The Commission’s emphasis on the symbolic dimen-
sions of reparation has enhanced the impression that financial compensa-
tion is losing favor.42
Defendants of monetary compensation oppose the dichotomy between
economic values and social meaning. They argue that monetary compensa-
tion is largely a symbolic attempt to acknowledge past injustices and the
suffering of victims: “Money symbolizes the irrevocable admission that a
crime has been committed. It allows a feeling of closure . . . the acceptance
of the giver.”43 Based on this logic, not claiming compensation also has the
37. See Charles Krauthammer, Reducing the Holocaust to Mere Dollars and Cents, L.A.
TIMES, 11 Dec. 1998, at 26, quoted in Bazyler, supra note 34, at 39.
38 The rest of society may have little sympathy for former victims “either because they are
members of racial, religious, or national minorities, or because they hold unpopular
beliefs.” Lutz, supra note 36, at 552.
39. See, e.g., Bazyler, supra note 34, at 40–41 (Their worries may not be unwarranted. A
critical account of the restitution movement with a “provocative” title, The Holocaust
Industry, written by Norman Finkelstein, a son of Holocaust survivors, in 2000, became
a best-seller in Germany and Switzerland).
40. MINOW, supra note 5, at 110.
41. Id. at 103.
42. The enormous potential of the TRC as a model that employs the meaning of truth and
reconciliation in the reparation process and the initial preference for symbolic
reparation among its commissioners have created an image of the TRC as a purely
spiritual enterprise. In fact, the TRC has recommended financial compensation followed
by other forms of (symbolic) reparations. See Truth & Reconciliation Commission of
South Africa, Truth & Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report V, at 175–95,
312–13 (1998). See also Hamber, supra note 7.
43. Natan Sznaider, Money and Justice: Toward a Social Analysis of Reparations, 3 HUM.
RTS. REV. 104, 109 (2002).
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symbolic meaning of maintaining victimization44 and injustice.45 Hypothesis
I is formulated to test the asserted importance of financial compensation.
Hypothesis I: Satisfaction with financial compensation enhances reparation.46
B. Retribution or Reconciliation?
“Truth v. Justice,” “Between Vengeance and Forgiveness,” “To Prosecute or
to Pardon?”47 These titles, written in the field of transitional justice, mirror
one of the key dilemmas of emerging democracies: how to overcome past
hostilities between victims and perpetrators. Should we punish or reconcile
with perpetrators? The debate involves a re-examination of the fundamental
principles of retributive and restorative justice.
Retributive justice focuses on the prosecution of perpetrators and the
establishment of individual criminal accountability. The Nuremberg trials,
international criminal tribunals for Rwanda and former Yugoslavia, and the
recent formation of the International Criminal Court are the most prominent
examples. Trials are alleged to satisfy the victims’ need for justice, reveal the
truth, and acknowledge their innocence and suffering.48 By so doing, trials
44. As Israel Singer, a leader of the World Jewish Congress, explains: “I don’t want to enter
the next millennium as the victim of history. . . . ,” quoted in Bazyler, supra note 34, at
41.
45. Id. (“[N]ot seeking financial compensation, in the face of documented proof that
financial giants worldwide are sitting on billions of dollars in funds made on the backs
of World War II victims . . . amounts to an injustice that cannot be ignored.”)
46. Reparation is defined here and in all other hypotheses, as a process to relieve the
suffering of and afford justice to victims by removing or redressing the consequences of
past wrongful acts and by preventing future violations. See, e.g., supra notes 2–4. It is
theorized to incorporate two dimensions, one sociopolitical and one internal. See infra
section III.
47. See TRUTH V. JUSTICE: THE MORALITY OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS (Robert I. Rotberg & Dennis
Thompson eds., 2000); MINOW, supra note 5; Pion-Berlin, supra note 11. However,
David A. Crocker argues that the dilemma must be avoided because “both truth
commissions and trials have distinctive and mutually supplementary roles in achieving
the multiple goals of transitional justice.” David A. Crocker, Truth Commissions,
Transitional Justice, and Civil Society, in TRUTH V. JUSTICE, id. at 99, 105. There are
numerous reasons why trials or truth commission may not be feasible or desirable: Do
we need to risk consequences of trying the military if victims do not have retributive
desires? Do we need to set up a truth commission if public truth-telling does not heal
victims?
48. See Fletcher & Weinstein, supra note 5, at 592–95 (a critical overview of the role of
trials as a response to the needs of victims). See also Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Punishment,
Redress, and Pardon: Theoretical and Psychological Approaches, in IMPUNITY AND HUMAN
RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 13, 19–21 (Naomi Roht-Arriaza ed., 1995) (finding
judicial process and punishment as an answer to the question of what kind of process
would lead to redress). Some authors consider victims’ needs as one of the several
justifications of trials. See Jaime Malamud-Goti, Transitional Governments in the
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release them from being trapped in the past and facilitate closure and
individual healing.49 Some criticize the use of alternative means, such as
truth commissions, in the place of trials. The main concern is whether
stability needs to be purchased at the expense of the victims, whose rights to
justice are denied.50
Supporters of alternative means of redress, such as truth commissions,
are skeptical about the ability of trials to satisfy the needs of victims. Trials,
they argue, are lengthy, inefficient, and have uncertain outcomes. As a
result, peace, which arises from the guarantee of human rights, is put at
risk.51 In addition to learning the truth and receiving social acknowledg-
ment, a truth commission is better suited to satisfy the needs of victims who
wish to tell their stories through a process that is considered to be
Breach, 12 HUM. RTS. Q. 1, 13 (1990); HUNTINGTON, supra note 11, at 68–69; M. Cherif
Bassiouni, Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice: The Need for Accountability, 59
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 26 (1996); Neil J. Kritz, Coming to Terms with Atrocities: A
Review of Accountability Mechanisms for Mass Violations of Human Rights 59 LAW &
CONTEPM. PROBS. 127, 128 (1996). On top of satisfying the needs of victims directly, trials
are also argued to have important roles in affecting the process of democratic transition,
thus having a positive impact on victims. Trials symbolize condemnation of the past
regime, the restoration of equality before the law, and the creation of the rule of law,
which facilitate normative transformation and help to consolidate a new democratic
culture. Finally, trials send anti-impunity signals to society and deter future recurrence
of violations. Thus, trials represent one of the means to realize van Boven’s principles.
See supra note 4. For an overview of the role of trials generally, see Diane F.
Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a
Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, excerpted in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE VOL. I, supra note 2, at
375, 376–78; TEITEL, supra note 2, at 28–30.
49. Based on a review of the psychological literature, Cullinan argues that the absence of
sanctions against perpetrators can function as “a second injury,” causing additional
anxiety, creating “a life of repetition of the trauma,” and prolonging psychopathological
consequences of repression. See CULLINAN, supra note 7, at 27.
50. One of the founders of the victim’s Khulumani Support Group, South Africa, testifying
at the TRC lamented that:
[I]t seems to me that victims have been asked to make sacrifices once again for the greater good
of the Nation, that we must give up our expectations of justice, we must give up our rights to civil
claims against perpetrators, and we must talk about our grief in this public forum and I’m afraid
we’re going to be asked to then accept symbolic reparation, or community reparation and I think
that this is simply not fair.
Testimony of M. Friedman to the Committee for Human Rights of the TRC (3 May 1996).
See also Nkosinathi Biko, Amnesty and Denial, in LOOKING BACK, REACHING FORWARD, supra
note 3, at 193 (explaining the motives of victims’ families to challenge the amnesty
provisions of the TRC Act at the South African Constitutional Court).
51. See KADER ASMAL ET AL., RECONCILIATION THROUGH TRUTH: A RECKONING OF APARTHEID’S CRIMINAL
GOVERNANCE 19 (1997). See also DESMOND M. TUTU, NO FUTURE WITHOUT FORGIVENESS 24–31
(1999) (Explaining why trials were not a viable option for South Africa.). Tutu also
referred to some high-profile cases, pragmatically arguing that if the options of trials
were available, they would have placed an intolerable burden on the already strained
judicial system and much needed resources. Id. The argument about the trade off
between stability and trials has been widely acknowledged. See, e.g., supra note 11.
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therapeutic.52 It also provides a unique forum where victims and perpetra-
tors can meet to restore their relationships. The truth commission process
facilitates reconciliation by allowing perpetrators to acknowledge their
responsibility for the suffering of their victims; it assists in restoring the
dignity of victims; it enables victims to articulate their feelings in order to
overcome hatred; and, finally, it assists in the re-humanization of perpetra-
tors.53 The post-amble of the South African Constitution (1993), which has
become a widely quoted symbol of progress towards the principles of
restorative justice and human dignity, stressed “a need for understanding
but not for vengeance, a need for reparation but not for retaliation, a need
for ubuntu but not for victimization.”54
In sum, retributive justice and restorative justice emphasize, albeit to
differing extents, the need of victims for truth and social acknowledgment.
They differ with respect to their treatment of victims’ need for retributive
justice, truth-telling, and reconciliation. Supporters of trials claim that an
unsatisfied desire for retribution undermines reparation. Supporters of truth
commissions argue that public truth-telling and reconciliation with perpe-
trators enhance reparation. At the heart of the debate are the purported
needs of victims that must be met before inner healing can take place.
Because assumptions about what those needs are have not been empirically
tested, this article contributes to this debate by developing and testing the
following hypotheses:
Hypothesis IIa: An unsatisfied desire for retributive justice inhibits reparation.
Hypothesis IIb: Public truth-telling enhances reparation.
Hypothesis IIc: Reconciliation with perpetrators facilitates reparation.
52. See, e.g., HAYNER, supra note 3, at 28, 133–53. (However, she also warns against the
danger of retraumatization at the truth commission’s hearings.) TUTU, supra note 51, at
128. (We “had not been expecting that those who approached the Commission would
often find healing and a closure in the process of recounting their often devastating
stories.”). Contra Biko, supra note 50, at 197 (“[T]he experience [of testifying at the TRC]
was traumatic for many victims, yet few were given adequate access to psychological
services.”)
53. See, e.g., Elizabeth Kiss, Moral Ambition Within and Beyond Political Constraints:
Reflections on Restorative Justice, in TRUTH V. JUSTICE, supra note 47, at 83 (“To pursue
restorative justice in the face of a legacy of oppression and violence means seeking to
restore dignity and voice to victims of injustice, holding perpetrators of injustice
accountable . . . , and adopting as an overriding goal the creation of conditions in which
all are treated with respect.”); MINOW, supra note 5; Truth & Reconciliation Commission
of South Africa Report I, at 125–31; Johnny de Lange, The Historical Contexts, Legal
Origins and Philosophical Foundation of the South African TRC, in LOOKING BACK,
REACHING FORWARD, supra note 3, at 14; Jodi Halpern & Harvey M. Weinstein,
Rehumanizing the Other: Empathy and Reconciliation, 26 HUM. RTS. Q. 561 (2004).
54. CONST. REP. S. AFR., Act. No. 200 (1993)
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C. Social Acknowledgment, Community Acceptance
and Democratization
“You need to heal the sociopolitical context for the full healing of the
individuals and their families, as you need to heal the individuals to heal the
sociopolitical context.”55 This statement encapsulates the third major
challenge of reparation programs, which many believe necessitate interven-
tions at both individual and societal levels. The central question is whether
individual reparation is also conditioned on societal acknowledgment and
community acceptance. Does the recovery of victims depend on political
factors including democratic transition and consolidation, the establishment
of the rule of law, and trust in the new state apparatus? Many transitional
justice scholars believe so.
Becker and others contend that effective repair must be elaborated
beyond the individual level to incorporate social reparation, which is
“simultaneously a sociopolitical and a psychological process.”56 This is
because the suffering arose from a political context that not only persecuted
individuals but suppressed the need to share their experience with oppres-
sion. The chronic fear of continuing victimization forces personal suffering
into silence; mourning is confined to the private realm of the very
individuals who often blame themselves for their victimization. Repair thus
requires establishing the truth of political oppression, and helps victims to
reconstruct the link between their personal victimization and structural
oppression. Becker and others argue that this can be achieved only when
society acknowledges the truth of political oppression. According to
Herman, social acknowledgment may help victims to establish their
humanity, dignity, and a sense of self, empowering and helping them to
reconnect with the outside world.57 Based on this argument, the following
hypothesis emerges:
Hypothesis IIIa: Social acknowledgment of past oppression facilitates reparation.
Social acknowledgment does not come about automatically. Many
post-transitional societies are in denial and, as a result, victims continue to
be stigmatized and marginalized. Past wounds cannot be healed if victims
continue to be suspected and isolated. The victims suffer a secondary
victimization as a result of a “conspiracy of silence.”58 Community and
55. Danieli, supra note 7, at 575.
56. See Becker, supra note 7, at 590.
57. JUDITH L. HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY: FROM DOMESTIC ABUSE TO POLITICAL TERROR 214–17
(Rev. ed. 1997).
58. See Danieli, supra note 7, at 573.
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social acceptance of victims and acknowledgment of their innocence are,
therefore, essential in helping individuals to accomplish reparation:
Hypothesis IIIb: Full integration into the civil society and community accept-
ance of the innocence of victims facilitates reparation.
In addition to social acknowledgment and integration, many believe
that macrostructural changes also determine the success of reparation.
Unlike the acts of individual criminals, which are random and unsystem-
atic, human rights violations are institutional and part of suppressive
mechanisms that require reform. It is therefore imperative to remove the
deep-rooted causes of human rights violations to secure a fully fledged
transition and to alleviate the fear of reoccurring violations. Without this,
many believe, healing cannot begin: “[A]ll efforts should be made that
similar violations will not occur in the future. In this connection it is
important to restore confidence in the rule of law and to take measures of
structural character.”59
Nevertheless, the structural roots of human rights violations, and the
fact that reparation requires structural changes, have not always been
acknowledged. For example, the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice
for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power60 does not distinguish between
treatment for victims of crimes and victims of political oppression.61 An
explicit structural dimension of individual reparation is also lacking at the
international criminal tribunals for former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Their
rules of procedure and evidence are limited to individual compensation that
has to be sought via national courts.62 The Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court goes further in postulating that “[t]he Court shall establish
principles relating to reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including
restitution, compensation and rehabilitation.”63 What is missing is the fourth
component of the van Boven-Bassiouni principles, satisfaction and guaran-
tees of nonrepetition, which postulates structural changes at the sociopolitical
level.
59. van Boven et al., Seminar on the Right to Restitution, supra note 33, at 502.
60. Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, G.A.
Res. 40/34, adopted 29 Nov. 1985, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. A/Res/
40/34/Annex (1985).
61. War rape is another example of a political crime that differs from an ordinary crime, an
“ordinary” rape: “[W]omen are facing twice as many rapists with twice as many
excuses, two layers of men on top of them rather than one, and two layers of impunity
serving to justify the rapes.” Catharine A. MacKinnon, Crimes of War, Crimes of Peace,
8 UCLA WOMEN’S L. J. 59, 65 (1993).
62. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N.
Doc. ITR/3/REV.1 (1995), entered into force 29 June 1995, Rule 106.
63. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. No. 75, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/
9 (1998) (entered into force 1 July 2002).
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Guarantees of nonrepetition are hypothesized to facilitate healing by
helping victims to rebuild their trust in society and by eliminating their fear
of further victimization. Political transformation is also entwined with the
identity of victims, most of whom had been involved in political projects to
end the oppressive system. Successful institutional reform and a sustained
process of democratization vindicate the value of their conviction and
rebuild that part of the self that was destroyed by the repressive regime. The
following hypothesis is based on this analysis:
Hypothesis IIIc: Satisfaction with the process of democratization facilitates
reparation.
D. Two Dimensions of the Reparation Process
Reparation of human rights abuses is theorized to incorporate two dimen-
sions: one sociopolitical and another internal.64 The first relates to structural
causes of oppression and its societal consequences for victims. It aims to
restore the dignity of victims in the eyes of the public, settle accounts, and
reveal the illegitimacy of the past regime, demanding political and judicial
interventions, institutional reform, and social acknowledgment. This first
dimension is referred to as sociopolitical redress 65 in this article. The
second, which is referred to as inner healing, is related to overcoming
physical and psychological consequences of oppression and imprison-
ment.66 Both dimensions may be addressed by policy interventions aimed at
meeting the needs of victims directly, as the subjects of policy, or indirectly,
through other measures for dealing with the past and democratization.
IV. INDICATORS
As a consequence of the paucity of empirical studies in the field of
transitional justice, there is no ready recourse to which the authors could
64. See Becker, supra note 7, at 590. See also CULLINAN, supra note 7, at 24 (discussing the
goal of reparation, she states that “[t]he end, or aimed-for situation has been variously
described as ‘healing’, ‘closure’, ‘rehabilitation’, or ‘mastery’ (terms connected with a
therapy ideal), and as ‘(re)integration’ or restoration to the original state (which are
connected with more political approach).”).
65. “Redress,” one of the English synonyms for “reparation,” in its earliest usage also
underlines this sociopolitical meaning. “The stripping of the Egyptians and the “re-
dressing” of the Israelites signifies more than a material settlement, it is a setting straight,
a ceremonial re-dressing, a rehabilitation in the public eye.” See TEITEL, supra note 3, at
120.
66. For the discussion of the concept of healing, see Orr, supra note 3, at 240–41.
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turn when operationalizing the key concepts of the hypotheses. Theories,
therefore, are the main guidance in this exercise. We also take into account
the specific policy background in the Czech Republic. The operationalization
incorporates both behavioral and perceptual variables.
A. Dependent Variables
Corresponding to the thesis that reparation incorporates sociopolitical
redress and inner healing, there are two dependent variables. The first is
derived from a question that asks “Do you feel rehabilitated?”, with
response categories of “definitely yes,” “rather yes,” “do not know,” “rather
no,” and “definitely no.” In the context of dealing with the past in the Czech
Republic, the word rehabilitation (rehabilitace) encompasses a variety of
different types of redress, especially repeal of unjust judicial decisions,
reinstatement in the original profession, and sociopolitical prestige. This
variable thus captures the sociopolitical aspect of reparation: redress in the
eyes of the public. Feeling rehabilitated is treated as a dichotomy, with
“definitely yes” and “rather yes” coded as 1, and all other responses coded
as 0.
The second dependent variable is derived from an item that assesses
whether the respondents have overcome the psychological and physical
consequences of their imprisonment, with response categories of “definitely
yes,” “rather yes,” “do not know,” “rather no,” and “definitely no.”
Overcoming the consequences of imprisonment is treated as a dichotomy as
well, with “definitely yes” and “rather yes” coded as 1, and “definitely no”
and “rather no” coded as 0. This variable captures the individual aspect of
reparation: healing as an inner process. These two dependent variables are
correlated (Pearson Chi-square563.07, p,0.001)67, suggesting that they
may partially overlap.
B. Predictor Variables
Although the Czech Republic has a program of financial compensation and
all but three of the political prisoners interviewed in this survey had
received compensation, not everybody was satisfied with it (see section VII).
This study measures the level of satisfaction (Hypothesis I) by using an item
with response categories of “definitely yes,” “rather yes,” “do not know,”
67. Both five point scale questions were condensed into a dichotomous variable with two
categories: those who replied “definitely yes” and “yes” were coded 1, 0 otherwise.
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“rather no,” and “definitely no.” Satisfaction with financial compensation is
treated as a dichotomy, with “definitely yes” and “rather yes” coded as 1,
and all other responses coded as 0.
An unsatisfied desire for retributive justice (Hypothesis IIa) is measured
using four indicators: (1) at the policy level, whether justice and punishment
of perpetrators should be the main focus of dealing with the past policy
(DWP); (2) at the individual level, whether punishment should be the only
satisfactory outcome of the trials of their perpetrators; (3) at the structural
level, whether the organization that sponsored political violence, namely,
the Communist Party, should be banned after the transition; (4) and finally a
question about support for the death penalty which, arguably, is the most
vivid expression of the core principle of retributive justice, lex talionis (an
eye for an eye, a life for a life). Because criminal trials of perpetrators were
almost absent in the Czech Republic, it was expected that the higher the
demand for retributive justice, the higher the level of dissatisfaction. Each
indicator is used as a separate dichotomous variable, with their respective
coding schemes presented at the bottom of Tables 2 and 3 below.
A public forum that provides victims with the opportunity to tell their
stories and to meet and restore their relationships with perpetrators, such as
the South African TRC, was not established in the Czech Republic. Victims,
nevertheless, had other opportunities to tell their stories publicly, e.g., via
the media and their associations.68 Some met their perpetrators in daily
encounters. Public truth-telling (Hypothesis IIb) is measured by combining
two items that assess the extent of the respondents’ opportunities for sharing
their stories publicly. The first item establishes whether the respondent has
tried to tell his or her story publicly, and the second item determines
whether his or her story was published when he or she had tried to tell his
or her story publicly. The variable has three categories: those who did not
try to tell their stories publicly, those who tried but their stories were not
published, and those whose stories were published, with the first group used
for baseline comparison in the regression analysis.
Reconciliation (Hypothesis IIc) is identified by two variables. The first
variable combines two items that assess the outcomes of interaction
between respondents and their perpetrators. The first item assesses whether
the respondent had met perpetrators, and the second item assesses the
outcome of the meeting, with response categories of “perpetrators remained
68. In an interview that preceded the survey, one of the former prisoners recalls that “[t]he
regional press, during the time when it was fashionable [shortly after 1989] willingly
published our letters and articles. Later however, when [the topic] lost its attractiveness,
the situation worsened.” Interview with former political prisoner, Prostejov (16 Nov.
1999).
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arrogant,” “they tried to avoid you,” “they considered themselves victims of
the system,” and “they apologized or made a gesture of forgiveness.” The
variable thus has five categories, with those who have never met perpetra-
tors coded as 0, “perpetrators remained arrogant” coded as 1, “avoided”
coded as 2, “considered themselves victims” coded as 3, “apologized”
coded as 4, and those who have never met perpetrators serving as the
baseline category for comparison. The second variable is derived from an
item that assesses whether the respondents had forgiven their perpetrators,
with three response categories of “yes,” “do not know,” and “no.”
Social acknowledgment of past oppression (hypothesis IIIa) is identified
by an item that assesses the respondents’ levels of satisfaction with the
knowledge of citizens about the past, with response categories of “definitely
yes,” “rather yes,” “do not know,” “rather no,” and “definitely no.”
Satisfaction with social acknowledgment is treated as a dichotomy, with
“definitely yes” and “rather yes” coded as 1, and all other responses coded
as 0. Social integration and community acceptance (Hypothesis IIIb) is
conceptualized to encompass two dimensions: how the victim is regarded
by the community and initiatives taken by victims to integrate. The first
dimension is indicated by two variables: the first variable is derived from an
item that assesses whether the town hall acknowledged the respondents’
past by inviting them to their functions, with response categories of “yes”
and “no.” The second variable is derived from an item that assesses the
attitudes of neighbors towards the respondents’ victimization, with response
categories of “regarded highly,” “behave normally as neighbors,” “they do
not care,” “they still think that I did something criminal,” and “other.”
Attitudes of neighbors are treated as a dichotomy, with “still think that I did
something criminal” coded as 1, and all other responses coded as 0. The
second dimension of social integration is indicated by two variables as well.
The first variable is derived from an item that measures the frequency of
church attendance by the respondent, with going to church once a week or
more coded as 1, and all other responses coded as 0. The second variable
is derived from an item that assesses the level of participation in voluntary
associations, with “no participation” coded as 0, “members” coded as 1,
and “hold leadership positions” coded as 2. The rationale of incorporating
two dimensions is that while the lack of community acknowledgment and
continued suspicion may accelerate the feelings of loneliness and isolation,
thus inhibiting the victims’ recovery, the agency of victims, in particular
their attempts to take initiatives for integration, may mitigate this process
and facilitate healing.
Satisfaction with democratization is measured by a composite scale. For
most transitional societies, institutional reform of the state and the establish-
ment of the rule of law are essential components of democratization. The
scale therefore consists of seven items measuring the respondents’ levels of
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trust in the four consecutive prime ministers after the transition,69 President
Havel, the Constitutional Court, and general courts, with an additional item
measuring their level of satisfaction with the general process of democrati-
zation. The response categories for the items are “definitely yes,” “rather
yes,” “do not know,” “rather no,” and “definitely no.” Higher scores on the
scale indicate lower satisfaction. The scale has an acceptable consistency
and reliability (Cronbach’s alpha 5 0.65).70
V. DATA
As part of this study, a cross sectional survey was designed and conducted
among former political prisoners associated with the Confederation of
Political Prisoners (KPV) and the Association of Former Political Prisoners
(SBPV) in the Czech Republic between 1999–2000. These organizations71
covered about two thirds72 of the total number of about 7,800 former
political prisoners in the country in January 2000.73 There are no means
available by which the remaining one third can be reached because the
69. See supra section II.
70. Lee J. Cronbach, Coefficient Alpha and the Internal Structure of Tests, 16 PSYCHOMETRIKA
297 (1951).
71. The KPV associates the majority of former political prisoners. The SBPV has about 200
members. However, not all ex-prisoners are members of these organizations. The
majority of members are victims from the Stalinist period of 1948–1968. There are a few
reasons for this. First, political prisoners do not form a homogeneous group. One of the
main differences originates in the period of imprisonment. Prisoners in the 1950s–1960s
went through much tougher prison/camp conditions than those in the 1970s–1980s.
The former call themselves “dissidents”, while the latter call themselves “resistance”.
The difference between the two groups was exacerbated when many members of the
latter group took public posts after 1989, while most from the former group were left
behind. The eldest group perceived numerous political concessions and compromises,
made by dissidents, as contravening fundamentals of the former anticommunist
opposition. In addition, some former prisoners are not eligible to join. Some dissidents
of the 1970s–1980s were former oppressors, ideologists or collaborators with the
communist regime in the 1950s–1960s. Interview with Stanislav Stransky, head of the
SBPV, Prague (Jan. 2000).
72. The estimation was between 4,500–5,500. The exact number is unknown because of
various reasons. First, the organizations, according to their members, “are gradually
dying out.” Indeed, in 1968, the predecessor organization K231 associated more than
100,000 former political prisoners. In 1990, the number dropped to about 10,000. In
2000, the membership halved. Second, many of their members are old, suffer from
serious diseases that prevent them from participating in activities of the organizations, or
attending the annual meeting. Third, those imprisoned for less than one year are not
entitled to free public transport, which inhibits their attendance at annual meetings,
where the stamps for free transport are distributed. On the other hand, stamps for free
transport motivate many others to attend the meeting.
73. Interview with Dr. Stanislav Drobny, head of the KPV, Brno (Jan. 2000) (based on the
data from the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs).
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Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs is not allowed to disclose their
identities. The cooperation with both organizations enabled a full sampling
frame: each member of the organizations was given a self-administered
questionnaire, which was distributed by the heads of local branches. This
was considered the cheapest and most feasible option because of the
effective organizational infrastructure of the KPV and SBPV, and the nearly
100 percent literacy rate in the Czech Republic. The questionnaire was
piloted by eighteen political prisoners. In total, 826 (a response rate of 18.35
percent) completed questionnaires were returned. Many respondents en-
closed comments on the research, detailed accounts of their personal
sufferings, and pictures. This showed their enthusiasm towards the research
and their need to share their experiences. Data from the questionnaires
were processed using SPSS. Cross-checking of data input was conducted to
ensure correct data entry. In addition, fourteen in-depth oral interviews and
eighteen correspondence interviews with former political prisoners were
conducted. Together with ten letters, twenty four enclosures to the question-
naires, and numerous comments in the questionnaires, these materials
contain narrative accounts of what justice and rehabilitation mean to the
respondents. Other sources of data include observations at the KPV
meetings at district and national levels, informal meetings with prisoners,
and reviews of bulletins published by both organizations, namely the
“Zpravodaj” [Newsletter] of the KPV and the “Verni zustali” [Faithful We
Stayed] of the SBPV.
VI. RESULTS
The subsequent analyses includes only those who gave a definite assess-
ment of the two outcome measures: inner healing and sociopolitical
redress. It begins with a comparison of the differences between those who
gave a positive assessment of their reparation with those who gave a
negative assessment (Table 1).
Table 1 shows that rehabilitated and nonrehabilitated persons differ
significantly in nearly all the indicators of the hypotheses, with the
exception of demand for retributive justice. Among its four indicators, only
one—support for death penalty—manifests significant differences between
the two groups. The two groups also show no significant differences with
respect to two of the four indicators of social integration: acknowledged by
town hall and frequent church going. All in all, most indicators work in the
expected directions, with the exceptions of public truth-telling and meeting
with perpetrators, which, in contradiction with predictions (Hypotheses IIb
and IIc), do not seem to facilitate reparation. A higher percentage of those
who do not feel rehabilitated had their stories published (23.4 percent) and
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had met their perpetrators (62.7 percent) compared with those of their “feel
rehabilitated” counterparts (18.8 percent and 44.8 percent respectively).
Unlike the first outcome measure (feel or do not feel rehabilitated),
demand for retributive justice seems to play a more important role in
differentiating the second outcome measure (overcome consequences or
not). Those who have overcome the consequences of imprisonment differ
significantly from those who have not with respect to three of the four
indicators of retributive justice. On the other hand, the indicators of
reconciliation seem less able to distinguish the two groups.
Table 2 presents the results of logistic regression for the first dependent
variable “feel rehabilitated,” which acts as a proxy for the first dimension of
reparation: sociopolitical redress. Logistic regression is appropriate when
the outcome measures are dichotomous and no observations are censored.
For the i th individual, this model can be expressed as: Log (q
i
/1–q
i
) =
!
0
+ "!
m
x
mi
, where q
i
 is the probability of a respondent to “feel rehabili-
tated,” !
0 
is the baseline
 
constant, and x
mi
 is an array of (m) predictive
variables with a corresponding vector of unknown regression coefficients
!
m. 
The models estimate how the probability of “feel rehabilitated” varies
according to the tested variables. In this analysis, the authors estimate six
models corresponding with the named hypotheses, with the addition of a
final model that controls for demographic characteristics and the respon-
dents’ experience of imprisonment.
As Model VII in Table 2 shows, satisfaction with financial compensation
turns out to be the most powerful predictor of a positive outcome of
sociopolitical redress. The odds ratio for the “satisfied with compensation”
coefficient is 13.03 with a 95 percent confidence interval of [6.11, 27.76].
This suggests that those who were satisfied with compensation are thirteen
times more likely to feel rehabilitated compared with those who were not
satisfied with compensation, lending support to Hypothesis I. None of the
indicators of demand for retributive justice is significantly associated with
feeling rehabilitated, rejecting Hypothesis IIa.
Although public truth-telling is significantly associated with feeling
rehabilitated, the direction of the association contradicts Hypothesis IIb,
which predicts that public truth-telling will facilitate reparation. Instead,
those who had attempted public truth-telling, but whose story was not
published, are nearly four times less likely to feel rehabilitated compared
with those who never attempted public truth telling. (The odds ratio for the
“public truth telling but story not published” coefficient is 0.27, 95 percent
confidence interval 0.10, 0.70.) There are two possibilities: public truth-
telling led to high expectations of policy intervention that was not delivered
and resulted in reduced probability of feeling rehabilitated. Another possible
explanation is reverse causation: those who were unsatisfied with dealing
with the past policy were more likely to attempt public truth-telling as a
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means to change the situation. Likewise, although the first indicator of
reconciliation is significantly associated with the dependent variable, the
relationship is far more complicated than a simple prediction of a meeting
promoting redress. Those who met their perpetrators but viewed them as
remaining arrogant were three times less likely to feel rehabilitated com-
pared with those who had never met their perpetrators (the odds ratio for the
“perpetrators arrogant” coefficient is 0.33, with a 95 percent confidence
interval of 0.17, 0.62). This suggests that meetings between victims and
perpetrators may revive old wounds and inhibit redress, in particular, when
the perpetrators show no remorse. At one level, the results lend some
support to Hypothesis IIc, which predicts reconciliation to facilitate redress.
At another level, it suggests the danger of unmonitored processes of
reconciliation, such as informal meetings and chance encounters between
victims and perpetrators.
The indicator of social acknowledgment is insignificant, thus rejecting
Hypothesis IIIa. Also, all four indicators of social integration are found to be
insignificant in the final model, rejecting Hypothesis IIIb. Satisfaction with
democratization, as measured by the composite scale, is significantly
associated with feeling rehabilitated. The odds ratio for the “satisfaction
with democratization score” coefficient is 0.90 with a 95 percent confi-
dence interval of [0.86, 0.95]. This suggests that an increase up the scale by
one unit, which indicates lower satisfaction, reduces the likelihood of
feeling rehabilitated by 10 percent, lending strong support to Hypothesis
IIIc. Finally, a return to one’s previous profession after release also facilitates
sociopolitical redress. Those who returned to their previous profession are
1.8 times more likely to feel rehabilitated when compared with those who
failed to do so (odds ratio 1.76, 95 percent confidence interval 1.06, 2.94).
In short, the results lend support to Hypothesis I (financial compensa-
tion) and Hypothesis IIIc (democratization), show the complicated relation-
ship between public truth-telling (Hypothesis IIb), reconciliation (IIc) and
sociopolitical redress, and reject Hypotheses IIa (retributive justice), IIIa
(social acknowledgment), and IIIb (social integration).
Table 3 presents the results of logistic regression for our second
dependent variable (overcome the physical and psychological conse-
quences of imprisonment), which acts as a proxy for the second dimension
of reparation: inner healing.
The models in Table 3 estimate how the probability of overcoming the
consequences of imprisonment varies according to the tested variables. As
Model VII shows, satisfaction with financial compensation is positively and
significantly associated with inner healing. Those who were satisfied with
financial compensation were twice as likely as their unsatisfied counterparts
to overcome the consequences of imprisonment (odds ratio 2.26, 95
percent confidence interval 1.33, 3.84). This lends support to Hypothesis I.
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A return to one’s previous profession after release also facilitates healing.
Those who returned to their previous profession were 1.7 times more likely
to overcome the consequences when compared to their counterparts who
could not return to their previous professions (odds ratio 1.65, 95 percent
confidence interval 1.04, 2.63).
Although “neighbors being suspicious” (an indicator of continued
social stigmatization) is not significantly correlated with sociopolitical
redress, it is significantly associated with inner healing. Those who claimed
to be suspected by neighbors were nearly four times less likely to have
overcome the consequences of imprisonment when compared with other
respondents (odds ratio 0.27, 95 percent confidence interval 0.09, 0.82).
The result lends some support to Hypothesis IIIb. Likewise, although being
tortured plays no significant role in the sociopolitical dimension of redress,
it is negatively and significantly associated with inner healing. Those who
experienced torture were about 1.8 times less likely to have overcome the
consequences of imprisonment in comparison with their counterparts who
did not experience it (odds ratio 0.57, 95 percent confidence interval 0.39,
0.83).
These findings confirm that reparation has two dimensions: one
sociopolitical and the other individual. Although both dimensions partially
overlap, with “satisfaction with financial compensation” and “return to
one’s previous profession” as their common correlates, they also have
distinctive mechanisms. While “satisfaction with democratization,” “public
truth-telling,” and “interaction with perpetrators” are significant correlates
of sociopolitical redress, they are not significantly related to inner healing,
which is associated more with neighbors’ suspicion and being tortured
(Figure 1).
VII. DISCUSSION
In this section, the results of the study are interpreted in light of narrative
accounts obtained during follow-up interviews with former political prisoners.
A. Financial Compensation
This study found satisfaction with financial compensation to be the most
powerful predictor of positive outcomes of reparation. As discussed below,
money facilitates inner healing by providing respondents with medical care
and compensating part of their economic loss, thus relieving some physical
and psychological consequences of imprisonment. Money also symbolizes
social acknowledgment and entails justice, thus enhancing sociopolitical
redress.
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Money helps to solve the pressing problems ex-political prisoners
confront on a daily basis, particularly expenses of health care caused by
their imprisonment and exacerbated by old age.74 This aspect of financial
compensation is evidenced by the following responses:
The thing that the government should do is to make the ageing of former
political prisoners easier. It mainly concerns health and medicine.75
Thanks to [our organization] we have certain advantages (free public transport
and subsidies for telephone calls). Thanks for this! [But] all of us came to the age
when we think about where and how to spend the rest of our lives. Could we
get certain preference in setting the order for the distribution of the pensions
and flats with social care?76
The above quotations attest to compensation as a means of access to
daily necessities. The problem is that, unlike a pension, compensation is not
automatically adjusted with inflation. This has led to dissatisfaction, particu-
74. The Czech Republic is a welfare state. According to its constitutional Charter of
Fundamental Rights and Basic Freedoms, Constitutional Act No. 2/1993, art. 31:
“Everybody has the right to protection of his or her health. Citizens are entitled under
public insurance to free medical care and to medical aids under conditions set by the
law.”
75. Correspondence interview with respondent No. 85 (Feb. 14, 2000) (on file with the
authors).
76. Enclosure to the questionnaire, respondent No. 363 (on file with the authors).
FIGURE 1
Factors Associated with Individual Reparation
Suspected by neighbors
Positively correlated (+)
Negatively correlated (–)
Sociopolitical
redress of victims
Inner healing
of victims
Satisfaction with financial compensation
Return to previous profession
Satisfied with democracy
Public truth-telling
Lack of reconciliation Tortured
ä ä
ä ä
ä
ä
ä
ä
ä
2005 Transitional Justice in the Czech Republic 423
larly when compensation was allocated in two installments with a gap of a
few years. While waiting for the second installment, all prices dramatically
increased because of the progressing liberalization of the price-controlled
economy.
Money also compensates for some of the consequences prisoners
suffered, which go far beyond slave labor, inhuman treatment, torture,
confiscated properties, reduced wages, and the loss of earnings. These
experiences are often described by respondents in detail or precisely cal-
culated. They also include severe persecution after release, drastic impact
on family, terrible social conditions and the denial of any opportunity to
improve them.77 However, the reparation policy focuses mainly on the
victims without acknowledging the sacrifices of their families, for example,
in the form of scholarships for children or free transport for spouses. Further,
due to budgetary constraints the policy aims to alleviate only some of the
injustices committed by the communist regime. For some victims, looking
from the perspective of ideal principles, partial justice remains injustice.
Yet political prisoners’ assessment of financial compensation depends
not so much on its face value, as on its symbolic meaning. For many, the
amount of compensation signifies how society values the worth of their
sacrifice and past suffering. Financial compensation sends a weighty signal
of acknowledgment that mere words of apology or gestures can never
achieve:
Money cannot compensate our suffering or the suffering of our families. Yet I
think it makes a moral gesture to acknowledge it.78
We live in a monetary society where one’s social status and dignity is measured
above all by money. The government should equalize financial compensation
to the level of prisoners of Nazism. This would be a minimum, though, because
77. The impacts on family included forced divorces, harassment and discrimination of
family members in employment or study, and appalling living conditions:
My wife, who was pregnant at that time [of my arrest] and looking after our 1.5 year-old baby, was
dismissed from her employment, broke down, and had to be taken to a hospital. Afterwards she
got a very badly paid job, which was not enough to sustain the family. She was constantly harassed
by the secret police, including house searching, confiscation of personal property . . . they forced
her to divorce me, which she refused.
Correspondence interview with respondent No. 129 (Feb. 11, 2000) (on file with the
authors).
After my release, I returned to the destructed family as an alien, my children were scared of [me].
Letter from J.R. to Roman David (Feb. 15, 2000) (on file with the authors).
[After my imprisonment], [m]y mother developed a psychological illness and never recovered. My
husband had to change his vocation of a priest. . . . Luckily, I did not have children.
Correspondence interview with respondent No. 56 (Feb. 2000) (on file with the
authors).
78. Letter from J.K. to Roman David (Feb. 15, 2000) (on file with the authors).
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prisoners of communism were imprisoned for twice as long and continued to be
harassed by secret police until the fall of communism.79
Because financial compensation symbolizes social acknowledgment,
inadequate compensation signifies society’s lack of concern for the prison-
ers’ welfare. Some even conclude that by not providing them with adequate
health care, society is quietly wishing the political prisoners to die faster,
thus bringing an end to their effort of remembrance and to be the
“consciousness of the nation.”80 As one respondent stated, “The Govern-
ment could try to improve . . . our healthcare (e.g., in spas). We think there
is an effort to achieve our fast disappearance—quietly pass away from this
world.”81
Finally, monetary compensation acts as a proxy for justice. Dissatisfac-
tion with financial compensation is often entwined with comparisons with
perpetrators,82 who, most victims complained, had received greater com-
pensation for their forced retirement after the fall of communism compared
to political prisoners:
Prison wardens who tortured us were dismissed in the beginning of the 1990s
but with compensation not less than CZK 100,000 and high pensions, while
their victims suffer with their pensions at the life minimum. Do you really think
that these diehard communists would come to apologize to anyone? They are
laughing in our faces.83
When I see deputies and senators who were members of the Communist Party
and now they have employment in which they do not do much but rest,
drink . . . where is justice?84
79. Letter from H.R. to Roman David (Feb. 14, 2000) (on file with the authors).
80. As an official record of an annual meeting of a local branch of their organization states:
“Year 2000 confirmed that we, though old and sick, are an obstacle for many people
because we are still eye witnesses of cruelties and crimes committed by communists.”
Zapis vyrocni schuze KPV pobocky Semily-Trutnov [Transcript of the Annual Meeting of
the KPV branch Semily-Trutnov], 19 Jan. 2001. The statement “we die out” stems from
feelings of isolation and serves as a coping strategy to strengthen togetherness and deal
with the aging and passing away of many members of their fellowship. Id.
81. Correspondence interview with respondent No. 164 (Feb. 2000) (on file with the
authors).
82. In addition to perpetrators, victims also compare themselves with their “rivals”: high
profile dissidents, Charter 77 signatories, and Prague Spring leaders who, as one
interviewee put it, “got fame, return of property, high salaries, and especially power”
after 1989. Letter from respondent No. 89 to Roman David (Dec. 19, 1999) (on file with
the authors). Occasionally, they refer to members of the formerly communist-sponsored
anti-Nazi “Association of Freedom Fighters” (SBS) who received wider social acknowl-
edgment and more generous financial compensation, and to those who were compen-
sated for their slave labor in Nazi Germany. Other reference groups are current
politicians who claimed compensation for their defamation and former civil miners in
uranium mines.
83. Letter from O.T. to Roman David (Feb. 7, 2000) (on file with the authors).
84. Correspondence interview with respondent No. 105 (Feb. 2000) (on file with the
authors).
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My wife and I went to a spa two years ago. We paid CZK 16,000 for three
weeks. I received CZK 2,000 subsidy as a former political prisoner . . . but
former secret policemen had their spa free of charge.85
Therefore many political prisoners demanded that their pension and
other benefits be equalized with those of perpetrators. For example, when
asked what the government should do for political prisoners, a respondent
suggested: “[t]ransfer each political prisoner regardless of the length of
imprisonment to a first pension category, the one similar to secret police and
policemen.”86
B. Return to One’s Previous Profession
In addition to satisfaction with financial compensation, return to one’s
previous profession after release is another variable that facilitates both
dimensions of reparation. Barring a person from reentering into their
previous profession indicates the continuation of political persecution while
reinstatement symbolizes the end of it, thus enhancing sociopolitical
redress. Reinstatement also helps individuals to rebuild their careers and
personal lives, thus facilitating inner healing. Before 1989, only a few
fortunate individuals were able to resume their previous professions after
release, with a few more after a certain period of time or during the
relatively liberal period of the Prague Spring. Those who were denied this
option consider it the most devastating consequence of their imprisonment.
It entails the loss of one’s career, opportunities of self-realization, and
earning potential:
I studied at the University (faculty of science—geology). . . . All my future and
career was destroyed, I finished my productive age as a miner after 30 years in
uranium mines. I do not regret this. . . .87
[The most dramatic life change due to imprisonment was] the definitive loss of
my profession as a journalist at the age of 28.88
After 1989, reinstatement was not always feasible for the aged, for those
suffering from illness as a result of imprisonment, or for those whose
businesses were not reestablished. In these cases, financial compensation
seems to be the only option. Yet the compensation policy primarily targeted
the length of imprisonment instead of persecution. This makes the policy
85. Letter from J.R. to Roman David (Feb. 15, 2000) (on file with the authors).
86. Correspondence interview with respondent No. 119 (Feb. 2000) (on file with the
authors).
87. Correspondence interview with respondent No. 24 (Feb. 2000) (on file with the
authors).
88. Letter from H.R. to Roman David (Feb. 14, 2000) (on file with the authors).
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inherently inadequate/unjust for those who were imprisoned for short
periods of time but were discriminated against in their employment for the
rest of their productive age. Reinstatement can therefore make a significant
impact on those who are still in their productive age, as the following case
indicates:
I studied at the school of medicine and was expelled just before my graduation.
After my release from the prison, I worked as an autopsy helper. After 1989,
pursuant to the ordinance of the Minister of Education, I could continue and
finish my studies in my fifties and start working as a GP.89
C. Lack of Reconciliation, Public Truth-Telling, and Neighbors’ Suspicion
The lack of reconciliation with perpetrators, in particular the perception that
perpetrators are hostile, inhibits sociopolitical redress. Reconciliation signi-
fies that past political conflicts and divisions have been overcome. On the
other hand, the lack of reconciliation suggests the continued influence of
the past over the present. Unfortunately, many victims and perpetrators are
still afflicted by the past. About half of the respondents had met their
perpetrators informally, and a mere 4.5 percent had received an apology.
Many reported that perpetrators displayed persistent negative behaviors,
such as being verbally offensive, arrogant, and indifferent, and giving
excuses for their past acts. Unhealed wounds and the general frustration that
perpetrators had not acknowledged their fair share of responsibility have
generated resentments that obstruct reparation. This draws attention to the
importance of setting up a formal and carefully monitored mechanism to
enhance positive outcomes of interactions between perpetrators and victims.
Although many respondents criticize perpetrators for showing no
remorse, the majority did not demand retributive justice. Even among those
who desired punishment, their unmet demands, resulting from the near
absence of criminal trials in the Czech Republic, have not significantly
obstructed the process of reparation. While not seeking punishment, many
victims insist that the truth be known:
The government should disclose the horror of the communist regime, [the
wrongs] it committed on political prisoners and their families.
I described my fate as a co-author of a book How to Walk in Rope. . . . The
nation should know the truth, although many are not interested in it anymore.
This is a tragedy of our time.90
89. Enclosure to the questionnaire from respondent No. 148 (on file with the authors).
90. Id.
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Many attempted public truth-telling facilitated via the media91 for
various reasons. However, the media may not be a suitable forum for truth-
telling. Many complained that its limited space prevented them from
narrating their stories fully and freely. Some political prisoners, because of
their old age, see truth-telling as a means to compensate for their feeling of
social marginalization and political isolation in the decision making
process. They hope that increased public awareness of the cruelty of the
communist regime will make people more vigilant against future threats;92
others see truth-telling as their vocation—if those who witnessed and
experienced it first hand do not disseminate the message, who will? Some
are frustrated by the general lack of interest in the past. The desire that
people have to move forward is sometimes expressed in a desire to forget
the past. The lack of social acknowledgment further vindicates this senti-
ment. By telling the truth, some political prisoners hope that they can renew
peoples’ interest in it.
In sum, attempts at truth-telling are driven by frustration with the current
political situation. The victims express their feelings of social and political
marginalization and disappointment with the ignorance of society and the
incomplete task of dealing with the past. Yet it seems that the process of
truth-telling only exacerbates this frustration by raising expectations of
greater social acknowledgment that are never met, hence inhibiting
sociopolitical redress. This is, however, not an argument against employing
truth commissions. No truth commission was established in the Czech
Republic that would offer sufficient space for victims to express themselves
freely and at the same time provide public acknowledgment, therapy, and
psychological assistance. This being said, those who promote truth commis-
sions should also be aware of the danger that they may also generate
unrealistic expectations among victims.
While 11 percent of our respondents are highly regarded by neighbors,
5 percent are still regarded with suspicion by their neighbors, which has
significantly reduced their chances of inner healing. Some neighbors envied
them for their compensation—“They talk about hundreds of thousands in
91. Although the media has revealed the horrific stories of victims’ suffering after the fall of
communism, many official documents about the secret police and their collaborators
remain secret.
92. “I seek to warn . . . from the danger that a new generation faces. As cunning as Satan is,
Communists know how to seduce the young and trusting population by their
demagogical promises.” Letter from P.B. to Roman David (on file with authors). These
warnings employ two mechanisms: some warn democrats against making mistakes that
might be utilized by communists in regaining power while the most common warning,
based on the widespread changes of party affiliations after 1989, is that communists
have de facto never lost their power.
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compensation.”93 Others still consider them criminals who “should stay
where they were.”94 Many respondents reported that those who informed on
them in the past still live in their neighborhood. We think that the lack of
reconciliation, social ignorance about, and disinterest in, the truth may lead
to the continued stigmatization of political prisoners by neighbors. This
suggests the connection between societal responses to dealing with the past
and microlevel interaction between victims and their immediate surround-
ings—the latter being partly determined by the former.
D. Satisfaction with Democratization
Satisfaction with democratization and trust in the Constitutional Court,
general courts, and highest political representatives are significantly associ-
ated with a positive assessment of reparation. The association seems
natural. Politics is interconnected with the lives of our respondents: they
were politically active in the past, were punished for their political beliefs,
and became political prisoners. They are zóon politicons, “political beings,”
persons having a vital interest in politics. About 92 percent of them voted in
the election of the House of Deputies in 1998. Moreover, 36 percent are
members of a political party or an association of interest, some of them even
holding high posts. Most had high hopes for the transition and felt betrayed
when the reality fell short of their expectations. They were particularly upset
by the continuing dominance of the old networks in politics and the
economy. As a respondent lamented:
[In 1989], I strongly believed that genuine freedom, democracy, order and
justice would come. Now I am deeply disappointed because it is not true at all.
Instead, . . . gross [economic] crime, corruption, fraud of national property and
banks . . . and politicians disinterested in solving the problems of the middle
class. . . . I see these everyday on TV and newspapers. I worry that the
communists will win the next elections.95
The 1998 elections that brought to power the left-wing social demo-
cratic government of Milos Zeman also upset many political prisoners, the
vast majority of whom voted for center-right parties such as the Civil
Democratic Party (ODS) and Christian Democratic Union (KDU). They also
felt betrayed by ODS when it formed a tacit coalition with the minority
social democrats.
93. Comment to the Questionnaire, Respondent No. 231.
94. Comment to the Questionnaire, Respondent No. 826.
95. Enclosure to the questionnaire No. 84 (on file with authors). The unstable political and
economic situation during the time of conducting the survey provided strong reasons for
such concerns. On the influence of the past elite, see David, supra note 10, at 413–16.
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As “political beings,” some political prisoners politicize social and
personal issues96 or run the risk of conspiracy theories. A respondent, for
example, insisted that “Prague Spring leaders and [dissents who signed]
Charter 77 were in fact financed by the West via the KGB . . . to destroy the
morality of the Czech nation.”97
Another difficulty is that the frame of reference of some of our
respondents is very rigid. Many hold a dualistic worldview that divides
people into two categories: “we” and “they,” “mukls”98 and “communists,”
“good” and “bad,” those who adhere to these principles and those who do
not. This dualism, paradoxically, mirrors dualistic categories held by their
totalitarian oppressors who were determined to liquidate class enemies for
a “better future.” Such a dualistic mentality runs in direct conflict with
democratic mentalities, which emphasize the pluralistic character of the
world and which rest on compromises. Politics in pluralist democracy is, in
Lord Acton’s words, merely “the art of the possible,” not the means to
pursue absolute ideals and principles.99 Alas, political compromises are
often viewed by political prisoners as a deviation from, or betrayal of, their
treasured principles. They are especially critical of political compromises
made by the government with respect to dealing with the past, which
includes preserving considerable legal continuity with the repressive re-
gime, partial de-Communization, alleviation of past injustices, and hesita-
tion to condemn Communism in the same way as Nazism.
E. Limitations
Before discussing the general policy implications of the findings, two limi-
tations of this research should be noted. First, the study is cross-sectional,
96. See GADOUREK & NEHNEVAJSA, supra note 7, at 47 (quoting a respondent who blamed the
political system for being responsible for the death of a family member: “Nor
concentration camps, nor government harmed her daughter who died of leukemia.”).
This perception stems from the nature of the totalitarian regime and its excessive
intrusion into the private life.
97. Letter from respondent No. 89 to Roman David (Dec. 19, 1999) (on file with the
authors). Conspiracy theories are used to explain the complexity of regime change.
They reflect mistrust in cognitive features of political processes and fears that stemmed
from the experience of severe persecution, infiltration, and omnipresent reporting
during communism.
98. “Mukl” is an abbreviation of “muz urceny k likvidaci,” a man designated for liquidation.
“Mukl” was invented by the ruling Communists to denote political prisoners of the
1950s and 1960s. Paradoxically, this term is very frequently used in the slang of the
prisoners group, perhaps to strengthen the group solidarity. Cf. supra note 87 and
accompanying text.
99. BERNARD CRICK, IN DEFENCE OF POLITICS (1962) (referring to R. Acton Butler’s famous
quotation).
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meaning that it is difficult to make statements of causation based on
associations because of the possibility of reverse causation. In addition to
cases already discussed, eventual reverse causations may occur between
satisfaction with democratization and assessment of reparation. Instead of
satisfaction with democratization facilitating reparation, satisfaction with
the redress that one has received may lead to a positive assessment of the
government and courts. Second, results may be biased because of the low
response rates. It remains unclear whether those who returned the question-
naire had characteristics that differed significantly from those who did not.
The respondents may consist of the more outspoken and active segment of
the political prisoner population. If this is the case, the sampling and
research method used in this study might have inadvertently excluded the
most isolated and marginalized segment of the population. On the other
hand, many of those imprisoned in 1970s and 1980s are still in their
productive age. They often hold administrative positions and are well
integrated into society. Few of them are active members of the two
organizations for political prisoners and thus might not have been reached
by the survey.
VIII. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The analyses presented herein confirm that reparation of human rights
violations consists of two partially overlapping processes: inner healing and
sociopolitical redress. Their outcomes are associated with factors and
interventions at various levels. At the individual level, satisfaction with
financial compensation and return to the original profession are positively
associated with reparation, while the experience of torture is associated
negatively. All of the factors at the community level—neighbors’ suspicions,
attempts at public truth-telling, and hostility of perpetrators—are negatively
associated with reparation. The positive association between satisfaction
with democratization and sociopolitical redress signifies the connection
between the political process and the reparation of political victims. Hence,
reparation of victims is not only a private matter, it is also part of a broader
process of rebuilding relationships between victims and the community,
society, polity, and perpetrators, as anticipated by van Boven’s principles.
These results give support, within their reach, to the ecological model of
social reconstruction, as theorized by Fletcher and Weinstein.100
To employ the best possible mechanisms of redressing victims, one
must consider changes and interventions beyond the individual level, as an
100. See Fletcher & Weinstein, supra note 5, at 621–35.
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individual is to return to his community, rejoin society, and reenter the
polity. Reparation must be part of a broader process that enables society to
come to terms with its past and launch political and structural reforms. The
system influences victims and victims desire to change the system. Victims
can stimulate the process of sociopolitical transformation and benefit from
it, if they are accepted and acknowledged.
An encouraging finding is that retributive measures are not significantly
associated with sociopolitical redress. This means that victims’ desires are
compatible with social reconstruction, a process that may only be feasible
in some countries if trials are not pursued.101 Nevertheless, although most
political prisoners do not demand punishment, they insist that the truth be
known and that perpetrators accept responsibility for their actions, at least
by expressing remorse. In the Czech Republic, the lack of responsibility and
remorse has generated a new source of bitterness amongst victims and has
perpetuated old divisions at the interpersonal level.
The findings further suggest that policy interventions should mix three
basic principles: they should occur gradually, at various levels, and with the
active participation of victims. The multilevel principle implies that repara-
tion should not only include isolated responses but, given the intercon-
nectedness of the systems’ components, should also include responses that
connect victims, the community, and perpetrators across the societal,
political, and institutional levels. The desire of victims to share their truth
publicly, their aspirations to return to their original professions, and their
political nature indicates that reparation should not be a one-sided process
in which victims are passive recipients. They need to be active elements in
the process and join the project of pursuing transition to democracy. Finally,
the principle that intervention should occur gradually is guided by a theory
about the hierarchy of human needs, pursuant to which the sequence of
interventions should start with those that satisfy the primary needs of victims
first, pursuing values such as reconciliation last.102 This theory is congruent
with the three stages of victims’ recovery, as maintained by Herman: the
establishment of safety, remembrance and mourning, and reconnection
101. In the light of the findings, the response of Madres from Plaza de Mayo could reflect the
inconsistency between individual reparation and political development. Once the
military puts pressure on the government to escape accountability, victims increase their
pressure too.
102. ABRAHAM MASLOW, MOTIVATION AND PERSONALITY 35–41 (1954), quoted in Fletcher &
Weinstein, supra note 5, at 624–25. The South African TRC was not designed exactly in
accordance with the gradualist approach. Its Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee
only held mandate to make recommendations, effectively sidelining the primary needs
of victims by promoting reconciliation with perpetrators. Cf. Amnesty International &
Human Rights Watch, Truth and Justice: Unfinished Business in South Africa (2003),
available at web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAFR530012003?open&of=ENG-ZAF.
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with others.103 Naturally, the cessation of violations, the release of all
political prisoners, and the dispersion of fear of continuing terror are
preconditions for any interventions. Understanding the needs of victims is
an initial step, followed by their empowerment and reconnection with their
social environment, and finally with the process of facing perpetrators.
Figure 2 summarizes the recommended policy interventions.
The truth commission has the potential to become a starting point for
interventions, and to initiate changes within the whole system. At present,
truth-telling only occurs at an informal level in the Czech Republic. The
lack of a more formal channel may account for its unsatisfactory results. A
truth commission could satisfy the need of victims to share their truth
publicly in a forum that offers an atmosphere for recounting their personal
narratives freely and provides the first acknowledgment of their suffering.
The added advantage of such a commission is that the stories of victims may
provide information about their needs, sufferings, and the patterns of
abuses.
Understanding the needs of victims is essential to designing the
reparation program at the individual level, which should include financial
compensation, reinstatement to previous positions, and psychological and
medical interventions, including a program designed to address the needs of
those who experienced torture. Our analyses show that financial compensa-
tion is the most powerful predictor of a positive assessment of both
dimensions of reparation, sociopolitical redress, and inner healing for ex-
political prisoners in the Czech Republic.104 Financial compensation not
only helps aging political prisoners solve their dire economic needs, it also
embodies the value of past suffering and acts as a proxy for justice. For all
its practical worth and symbolic meanings, financial compensation should
be an essential component of any program of redress. In spite of the
difficulty of finding the necessary economic resources and the administra-
tive uncertainty surrounding implementation, transitional countries should
not be tempted to circumvent the difficult task by substituting it with purely
symbolic measures of redress, such as social acknowledgment, apology, or
truth. Real healing can only be achieved in these countries if they do not
103. HERMAN, supra note 57, at 155–213.
104. We therefore support the recent move in the Czech Republic, whose Parliament
decided to provide victims with further compensation in 2001. See Act Providing the
Participants of the National Resistance, Political Prisoners, and Persons Placed to
Military Labor Camps due to Racial or Religious Reasons with One-time Financial
Amount, Act No. 261/2001 Sb. Those imprisoned for more than three months, but less
than one year, were entitled to a compensation of CZK 60,000 (US $2,000). Those
imprisoned for more than one year were entitled to CZK 120,000, with CZK 1,000 for
each additional month of imprisonment.
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FIGURE 2
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avoid the rapid implementation of financial compensation. Reinstatement to
previous professions is also vital to achieve reparation, particularly for those
who are educated and in their productive years. The new democratic
regime could facilitate this either through legal means (as in the Czech
Republic), by incorporating former political prisoners into appropriate
positions in the civil service or government funded NGOs, or by providing
opportunities for continued education and training for the preparation of
obtaining a job in the labor market.
When victims share their experiences of suffering with the rest of
society it can stimulate an understanding of the past and simultaneously
provide sympathy and social acknowledgment that may help to dispel
stigmatization, such as they may experience at the hands of neighbors. This
can promote attitudinal changes within society and communities and
increase social pressure on perpetrators. Finally, the testimonies of victims
about the patterns of abuses can contribute to the advancement of structural
and institutional reforms. Reforms that are enlightened by understanding
past abuses may also lead to sanctions against perpetrators, which would in
turn facilitate the successful functioning of a reconciliation commission.
Such reforms can utilize the expertise of victims by electing or appointing
their representatives into positions of influence, thus forging mutually
beneficial relationships between victims and the political sphere. On the
one hand, the inclusion of victims would enhance the skill and legitimacy of
reform, on the other, victims would be pleased to have a voice and a
platform of participation.
The last step could include the meetings of victims with perpetrators at
a formal venue in order to promote their reconciliation and to spread the
reconciliatory message in society. A reconciliation commission, strength-
ened by the possibility of sanctions against perpetrators, is arguably the best
option.105 Yet even these formal platforms need careful guidance to ensure
that victims do not generate overly high expectations and do not need to
face hostile and remorseless perpetrators.
Reparation should be an ongoing process, and should not be confined
to one-off interventions. Moreover, policy components do not suit the needs
of all victims equally. There is a danger that truth-telling and exposure to
105. In contemplating a reconciliation commission, inspiration is drawn from the amnesty
committee of the South African TRC. Similarly, the proposal of a truth commission
reflects the TRC’s human rights violations committee. Individual level interventions,
including financial compensation, psychological and medical interventions, and rein-
statement to the previous profession may be facilitated by a reparation and rehabilita-
tion committee in case the old networks retain influence over the implementation of
reparation programs.
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perpetrators may inhibit the process. Due to its uncertain outcomes, each
stage of the process must be voluntary and reviewed.106
While adhering to the principle of the universality of human rights, the
fact that reparation for human rights violations poses serious challenges in
various cultural settings must be recognized. Different societies may have
different understandings of concepts of justice, healing, reconciliation and
forgiveness. Victims of other types of human rights abuses, such as slavery,
rape, and genocide, and victims who suffered in other contexts, such as civil
war and ethnic conflict, may have different needs from those of prisoners of
totalitarian regimes. Opinions may differ amongst victims themselves and
between victims and their immediate families and dependents. This points
out to a pressing need for cross-cultural and comparative research in this
field.
106. Cf. Hamber, supra note 7 (“[M]aking space for the complaints and opposition of
survivors should be seen as an integral component of any reparations programme.”);
HERMAN, supra note 57, at 133 (Survivor “must be the author and arbiter of her own
recovery. Others may offer advice, support, assistance, affection, and care, but not
cure.”).
